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In January 2011, the new guidelines on horizontal
cooperation agreements and the restated block exemp-
tion regulations on research and development and on
specialization and joint production of the European
Commission entered into force. The aim of these new
documents was to ‘bring more legal certainty’, to
‘match market developments and respond to the needs
of modern businesses’ and to ‘prevent competition
concerns from arising from the outset, rather than only
addressing concerns ex-post’ commented the Director
General of the Directorate General for Competition,
Alexander Italianer, a few weeks after the new guide-
lines and regulations replaced the former documents.1
In addition to the goal to increase legal certainty the
Commission intended to strengthen the innovation and
competitiveness as well as to minimise agreements which
are anticompetitive. According to Commission Vice Pre-
sident responsible for competition policy, Joaquı´n
Almunia, ‘one of the overarching goals of the new rules
is to contribute to the Commission’s Europe 2020 strat-
egy, in particular by promoting innovation and competi-
tiveness’ whereas the ‘new Guidelines and Block
Exemption Regulations will give companies the necessary
freedom to cooperate in a globalised market place, while
at the same time minimising the risk of agreements that
are harmful to industry and to consumers.’2
This article will give a short overview of the new
documents and assess to what extent the goal of the
Commission may be achieved by the new guidelines
and block exemption regulations.
For this purpose, the article will first outline the back-
ground of the new guidelines and regulations and give a
short overview in this section, before summarising the
new block exemption regulations for research and devel-
opment (Section II.A.) and for specialisation (Section
II.B). Then the new guidelines on horizontal cooperation
will be analysed in more detail in Section III. with a
special focus on information exchange (Section III.A.)
and standardisation (Section III.B.). This article will then
analyse the practical consequences of these documents for
companies in Section IV. with some specific remarks on
the block exemption regulations for research and devel-
opment and for specialisation (Section IV.A.) as well as
on the new chapters in the horizontal guidelines on infor-
mation exchange (Section IV.B.) and standardisation
(Section IV.C.). Finally, a critical analysis on the new
documents in Section V. will conclude this article.
A. Background
On 14 January 2011, the Commission’s revised guidelines
on the application of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal
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2 Press Release of the European Commission, Commission adopts revised
competition rules on horizontal cooperation agreements, 14 December
2010, IP/10/1702, ,http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
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Key Points
† In its new approach to horizontal agreements,
the Commission expands the range of efficiency
considerations that can be taken into account to
assess practices.
† The objective is reached, partly at least, in the
Regulation, which provides more clarity on
issues important in that regard.
† But the Guidelines remain desperately vague –
potentially causing a ‘chilling effect’ towards effi-
cient practices and creating a risk that firms may
unconsciously engage in unlawful activities.







cooperation agreements (‘Horizontal Guidelines’)3 were
published in the Official Journal, along with the revised
block exemption regulations on research and develop-
ment (‘R&D BER’),4 and on specialization and joint pro-
duction agreements (‘Specialisation BER’).5 The new
Horizontal Guidelines replace the 2001 Horizontal
Guidelines.6 The previous guidelines that serve as a fra-
mework for horizontal cooperation agreements expired
on 31 December 2010.
The new block exemption regulations entered into
force on 1 January 2011 with a two-year transitional
period, during which the former regulations remain
in force for all agreements which meet the conditions
of these regulations but which do not fall under the
new rules. Agreements in these specific sectors are
authorised provided the companies concerned have
limited market power, which means a market share
of no more than 25 per cent for research and devel-
opment agreements and 20 per cent for specialisation
or joint production agreements.7
B. Overview
The new Horizontal Guidelines provide an analytical
framework for assessing the most common types of
horizontal cooperation agreements, such as research
and development, production, purchasing, commercia-
lisation, standardisation, and information exchange.
The two key features of the new Horizontal Guidelines
are a new chapter on information exchange and a sub-
stantial revision of the chapter on standardisation
agreements. The chapter on information exchange now
provides general guidance in this area.8 Before the new
Horizontal Guidelines entered into force companies
had only some sector-specific guidance for information
exchange concerning liner shipping, which was com-
prised in the Maritime Guidelines of 2008.9
According to the Commission, the new documents
update the application of the general competition law
rules by the Commission to these specific forms of
agreements so that companies can better assess whether
their agreements are in line with the EU Regulations,
the Commission’s decisions and the jurisdiction of the
EU Courts. To finalise these new documents the Com-
mission launched a public consultation on 4 May 2010
on the application of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal
cooperation agreements, and published revised drafts
of the Horizontal Guidelines and the new R&D BER
and Specialisation BER for comments.
The basic approach of all revised documents—the
new block exemption regulations and the Horizontal
Guidelines—is to give more detailed and clearer gui-
dance for companies in the respective areas.10 The
amendments, innovations, and enhancements will now
be assessed in more detail.
II. Restated Block Exemption
Regulations
Before the new regulations entered into force guidance
was provided by two previous block exemption Regu-
lations—the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2659/
2000 on Research and Development Agreements and
the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2658/2000 on
Specialisation Agreements. The two block exemption
regulations exempt research and development
cooperation as well as specialization and joint pro-
duction agreements from the general ban on restrictive
business practices laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU,
3 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal cooperation
agreements, 2011/C 11/01, 14/01/2011, OJ 11/1–72, ,http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN
:PDF..
4 Commission Regulation No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
Eurpean Union to categories of research and development agreements,
18/12/2010, OJ L 335/36–42, ,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:335:0036:0042:EN:PDF..
5 Commission Regulation No 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the
application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialisation
Agreements, 18/12/2010, OJ L 335/43–47, ,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:335:0043:0047:EN:PDF..
6 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the
EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements (‘Horizontal
Guidelines’), 2001/C 3/02, 6/1/2001, OJ C 3/2–28, ,http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:003:0002:0030:EN
:PDF..
7 For further information regarding the drafts, see Lu¨bbig, Die Reform der
EU-kartellrechtlichen Regeln u¨ber die horizontale Zusammenarbeit,
[2011] EWS 5–8; Drexl, Fru¨h, Mackenrodt, Picht, Pulyer, and Ullrich,
Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,
Competition and Tax Law on the Draft Commission Block Exemption
Regulation on Research and Development Agreements and the Draft
Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, IIC (2010) 41, 948 –
965.
8 Concerning a short comment on the Horizontal Guidelines, [see
Camesasca and Schmidt, ‘New Horizontal Guidelines: Providing Helpful
Guidance in the Highly Diverse and Complex Field of Competitor
Cooperation and Information Exchanges’ 2011 JECLAP 227–229].
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006, i.e. liner
shipping services, cabotage and international tramp services’ (‘Maritime
Transport Guidelines’). For additional information to these guidelines,
see Bermig and Ritter, ‘The new Guidelines on the application of Article
81 of the EC Treaty to the maritime sector’ [2008] Competition Policy
Newsletter 25–9; Guersent, The Guidelines on Maritime Transport
Services, Speech at the European Maritime Law Organisation,
Copenhagen 24 Ocotber 2008, ,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
speeches/text/sp2008_12_en.pdf..
10 See Italianer, Speech at Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht Conference on 1
March 2011 in Brussels, the available at: ,http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/speeches/text/sp2011_01_en.pdf..
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provided they meet all the conditions set out in these
regulations.
A. Research and Development Block
Exemption Regulation
The revised R&D BER which entered into force on
1 January 2011 and expires on 31 December
202211 replaces the former Block Exemption Regulation
on Research and Development Agreements12 which
expired on 31 December 2010. The objective of the
new R&D BER is to meet two requirements: ensuring
effective protection of competition and providing ade-
quate legal security for undertakings.13 The objectives
should take account of the need to simplify administra-
tive supervision and the legislative framework to as
great an extent as possible.14
One of the key elements of the R&D BER is the
insight that certain research and development
cooperation activities by small enterprises will not
distort competition because of their small market
power. Cooperation between competitors to jointly
undertake and subsequently exploit R&D activities in
this case may promote technical and economic pro-
gress, especially where the parties contribute comp-
lementary skills, assets, or activities to the
cooperation.15 Thus, the R&D BER generally presumes
for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU that below a
certain level of market power the positive effects of
research and development agreements will outweigh
any negative effects on competition.16
As before, the R&D BER provides an automatic
exemption for joint research and development of pro-
ducts or technologies, as well as the horizontal special-
isation or joint exploitation of those results under the
condition that the parties’ combined market share in
the relevant product or technology market does not
exceed 25 per cent.17 If the market share exceeds 25 per
cent, the exemption will last a further two years follow-
ing the year the threshold of 25 per cent was
exceeded.18 If, however, the market share exceeds 30
per cent, the exemption will persist for one further
year only. Another condition is that where the R&D
agreement provides only for joint R&D, the parties
must agree to give access to each others’ pre-existing
knowledge.
The new R&D BER is characterised by the wider
scope of its application. Most of the changes and
amendments of the new R&D BER will provide more
clarity and legal certainty.19 The new regulation now
covers not only activities carried out jointly by the
involved companies but considers also so-called ‘paid-
for research agreements’. These sorts of agreements
cover arrangements where one party merely finances
the research carried out by another company. The R&D
BER is based on the presumption of the Commission
that joint research and development activities have
positive effects, especially in cases where the parties do
not have market power.
Besides that, the possibility to jointly exploit the
results of R&D activities has been extended. Parties to
an R&D activity can now profit from the exemption
where only one party sells the contract products on the
basis of an exclusive licence by the other party.
Moreover, the revised R&D BER takes into account
‘patent ambush’ cases. The Commission noted that a
party’s intellectual property rights shall not unduly
impair the exploitation of the results of an R&D agree-
ment by the other parties and therefore an exemption
under the new R&D BER should be available if prior to
starting the R&D activity all parties agree that they will
disclose in an open and transparent manner their exist-
ing and pending intellectual property rights relevant
for the exploitation of the results by the other parties.20
B. Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation
The revised Specialisation BER also entered into force
on 1 January 2011 and replaces the former Specialis-
ation Block Exemption Regulation which expired also
on 31 December 2010. The new Specialisation BER
clarifies that the benefit of exemption may also apply
even when one of the parties to the agreement only
partly ceases its production. This enables a company
that has two production plants for a certain product to
close down one of its plants and outsource the output
11 Article 9 R&D BER.
12 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and
development agreements, OJ L 304, 5/12/2000, 7.
13 R&D BER, para. 4.
14 R&D BER, para. 4.
15 R&D BER, para. 8.
16 R&D BER, para. 4.
17 Article 4, para. 2 R&D BER.
18 The Commission noted at the time the new R&D BER entered into force
that ‘with a 25% market share threshold, R&D agreements are the most
favourably treated category of horizontal agreements as such agreements
can lead to substantial efficiencies because they stimulate innovation’,
MEMO/10/676, para. 3/4.
19 MEMO/10/676, para. 14.
20 MEMO/10/676, para. 14. The Commission noted in this context that is
has ‘become apparent during the public consultation that there is no
practical need for such a disclosure obligation as, in particular, potential
patent ambushes in the context of R&D agreements can be adequately
addressed by the parties through private contractual agreements.’
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of the closed plant while still benefiting from the
exemption under the Specialisation BER.
The new provisions also introduce a second market
share threshold where the agreement concerns inter-
mediary products. It provides that, where the products
concerned by a specialisation or joint production
agreement are intermediary products which one or
more of the parties use for the production of certain
downstream products which they also sell, the exemp-
tion is conditional upon a 20 per cent market share
threshold downstream. In case of a higher market
share such a specialisation or joint production agree-
ment should not benefit from an exemption under the
Specialisation BER since there may be a potential risk
of closing off inputs for competitors at the level of the
downstream products. In this case an individual
assessment according to Article 101(3) TFEU is
required.
The Specialisation BER provides ‘safe harbours’ for
certain specialisation and joint production agreements
below the market share threshold from the scope of
Article 101 TFEU. In general three ‘safe harbours’ can
be identified: (i) unilateral specialisation agreements,
where one party agrees to cease or refrain from pro-
duction and purchase the product from another party;
(ii) reciprocal specialisation agreements, where two or
more parties agree reciprocally to cease or refrain from
production of certain different products and purchase
them from another party; and (iii) joint production
agreements, where two or more parties agree to
produce certain products jointly.
III. New Horizontal Guidelines
On 4 May 2010 the Commission published draft regu-
lations and guidelines for the assessment of
cooperation agreements between competitors.21 The
new Horizontal Guidelines22 replace the 2001 Horizon-
tal Guidelines and contain two new elements: the
former Guidelines did not deal with the exchange of
information between competitors and the new Hori-
zontal Guidelines amend the chapter on standardis-
ation agreements.
In the new Horizontal Guidelines the Commission
acknowledges that horizontal cooperation can lead to
substantial economic benefits, in particular if they
combine complementary activities, skills, or assets.23
Horizontal cooperation can be a measure to share
risk, save costs, increase investments, pool know-how,
enhance product quality and variety, and launch
innovation faster.24 On the other hand, however, hori-
zontal cooperation agreements may lead to compe-
tition problems—for example if the parties agree to
fix prices or output, to share markets, or if the
cooperation enables the parties to maintain, gain, or
increase market power—and thereby is likely to give
rise to negative market effects with respect to prices,
output, innovation, or the variety and quality of
products.25
A. Information Exchange
Information exchange among competitors is one of the
most sensitive and critical area of competition law and
requires a careful consideration of all aspects. Agree-
ments or concerted practices which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition constitute a competition law infringement
according to Article 101(1) TFEU.26 Thus, as a general
rule, commercially sensitive information must not be
exchanged with competitors, since companies must
operate independently of their competitors. This
general rule, however, is not easy to assess in all cases.
In the light of increasing fines, companies and their
legal advisors have frequently complained that they
lack sufficient official guidance on how to structure
information exchange without running the risk of
infringing competition law.27 The chapter on infor-
mation exchange is a new element in the 2011 Hori-
zontal Guidelines.28 The problems in connection with
exchange of information between competitors,
however, form a classic area of legal uncertainty. As
such, the question of the permissibility of information
exchange has been discussed since several decades.29
Before the new Guidelines entered into force,
companies looking for guidance might consult the
21 Berg/Koebele, Round Up, [2010] JECLAP 444; Lu¨bbig, ‘Die Reform der
EU-kartellrechtlichen Regeln u¨ber die horizontale Zusammenarbeit’
[2011] EWS 5; Mo¨hlenkamp, ‘Informationsaustausch als
Wettbewerbsbeschra¨nkung—Kriterien und Beweislast’, FIW,
Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, 2010, 209.
22 Gehring/Ma¨ger, ‘Kartellrechtliche Grenzen von Kooperationen zwischen
Wettbewerbern—Neue Leitlinien der EU-Kommission’, [2011] Der
Betrieb 398.
23 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 2.
24 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 2.
25 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 3.
26 Jones, ‘Left behind by modernisation?—restrictions by object under
Article 101(1)’ [2010] European Competition Journal 649.
27 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’ [2011] KSzW 87–94.
28 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Who is’t that can inform me?—The Exchange of
Identifying and Non-Identifying Information’ [2007] ECLR 264.
29 For example Carle and Johnsson, ‘Benchmarking and E. C. Competition
Law’ [1998] ECLR 74; Feldkamp, ‘Statistische
Marktinformationsverfahren und das europa¨ische Kartellrecht’ [1991]
EuZW 617; Wagner-von Papp, ‘Wie “identifizierend’ du¨rfen
Marktinformationsverfahren sein?’ [2005] WuW 732.
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Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to Maritime Transport Services (Maritime Trans-
port Guidelines)30 which provided a framework for
information exchange within the sector of maritime
transport.31 However, this general framework was con-
tained in a sector-specific context which lead to the
question whether the chapter on information exchange
was of general applicability.32 While it was generally
assumed that this guidance would be applicable to
information exchanges in other sectors as well, the
exact degree of transferability remained a matter for
speculation.33
The Horizontal Guidelines now explicitly state that
certain forms of information exchange may have, in
itself, the object of restricting competition and that
such information exchanges are not covered by the
guidelines. This distinction between restriction by
object or effect has recently been emphasised by the ECJ
in T-Mobile34 and the Commission refers to this dis-
tinction in the new Horizontal Guidelines by focusing
on agreements and practices having the object, rather
than the effect, or restricting, distorting, or preventing
competition. The Horizontal Guidelines make it clear
that information exchanges which are restrictive by
object are not covered by the Horizontal Guidelines,
since these practices are per se illegal. Thus there is, in
addition, no need to carry out analytical assessments in
these cases in order to determine whether or not the
exchange of information is caught by Article 101 TFEU.
Whereas information exchange may lead to substan-
tial economic benefits, exchange may also, under
certain circumstances, have the effect of reducing or
removing uncertainty as to the future behaviour of the
market players, with the result that competition
between undertakings is restricted. A restriction of
competition may occur if certain circumstances are
present, such as a concentrated market structure and
exchanges of commercially sensitive information.
† The market structure is to be assessed in view of the
level of concentration and the structure of supply
and demand, notably the number of competitors,
the symmetry, and stability of their market shares
and the existence of structural links between them.
† Whether information is sensitive depends on its age
and the period to which it relates, its aggregated or
individualised nature and the frequency of the
exchange. It also depends on whether the infor-
mation is public or not, although in some cases
public information may be enhanced or combined
or made more accessible in a way that makes it
sensitive.
The exchange of historic data is unlikely to lead to a
collusive outcome as it is unlikely to be indicative of
the competitors’ future conduct or to provide a
common understanding on the market.35 The Horizon-
tal Guidelines give no guidance to the question when
information can be considered as ‘historical’. Accord-
ingly, the historical or recent nature of the information
needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis with regard
to all other factors in the relevant market. In this
context the Commission noted in the Horizontal
Guidelines that the three key factors—age, level of
aggregation, and frequency—will be assessed by the
Commission as a whole rather than separately, because
some factors may have an impact on others.
B. Standardization
According to the growing role of industry standards to
facilitate innovation, the revised chapter on standardis-
ation in the new Horizontal Guidelines sets out the cri-
teria under which the Commission will not take issue
with a standard-setting agreement. The chapter reflects
more than ten years of experience with standardization
agreements. The revised chapter on standardization is
longer and more precise than the corresponding
chapter in the 2001 Horizontal Guidelines. The new
provisions clarify in detail how to assess the compat-
ibility of standard setting systems with Article 101
TFEU.
The new chapter supports a standard-setting system
that is open, transparent, and fair and increases as such
the transparency of licensing costs for intellectual prop-
erty rights as a basis for standards, like patents. For
this reason the new Horizontal Guidelines set out the
rules for standard setting systems on ‘fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms’, the so-called FRAND
30 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Maritime
Transport Services, 2008/C 245/02, OJ C245/2, 26/9/2008, paras 38–59,
para. 41 et seq.
31 Before the Maritime Transport Guidelines entered into force in 2008
parties of a cooperation agreement had to consult the Commission’s 7th
Report on Competition Policy 1977. See Wagner-von Papp, ‘Draft
Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal
Cooperation Agreements’ [2010] JECLAP 422–424.
32 The scope of the Maritime Transport Guidelines was limited to the
assessment of ‘cooperation agreements in those maritime transport
services directly affected by the changes brought about by Council
Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006, i.e. liner shipping
services, cabotage and international tramp services’ (Maritime Transport
Guidelines, para. 1).
33 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’ [2010] KSzW, 87–94.
34 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile [2009] ECR I-4529.
35 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 90.
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criteria.36 According to the new Horizontal Guidelines,
an effective standard-setting process should take place
in a non-discriminatory, open, and transparent way so
as to ensure competition on the merits and to allow
consumers to benefit from technical development and
innovation.37 One of the key elements of the standard-
ization chapter is on effective access to standard-setting
procedures and to intellectual property rights which
provide certain technology in order to implement
adopted standards.
The new and revised chapter on standardisation
defines some criteria under which standardisation agree-
ments will not be considered as anticompetitive and as
such defines some ‘safe harbours’ for industry practice.
With a view to providing clear and useful guidance, the
Commission adopted this ‘safe harbour’ approach: if the
standard-setting process complies with the defined prin-
ciples, it should normally not fall within Article 101(1)
TFEU whereas standard setting processes that do not
remain within the ‘safe harbour’ are not presumed to be
illegal.38 Outside the ‘safe harbours’ companies are
required to analyse the standard-setting conditions in a
self-assessment according to Article 101(3) TFEU.
The revised chapter defines as the two most impor-
tant conditions for safe harbour exceptions under
Article 101(1) TFEU the faith disclosure of intellectual
property rights for the standardisation technology as
well as access to standards according to the FRAND
conditions. For the ‘safe harbour’ exception the criteria
are (i) the requirement of unrestricted access and par-
ticipation of all interested companies;39 (ii) transpar-
ency and the good faith disclosure of standard-
essential IPR’s;40 (iii) the voluntariness of participation
in the standardization technology;41 and (iv) access to
the standard on FRAND terms.42,43
In addition, the revised chapter on standardisation
provides detailed guidance on standardisation agree-
ments that do not fulfil the criteria for ‘safe har-
bours’ and will be considered anticompetitive under
Article 101 TFEU. As such the two most important
elements of the standardization chapter cover the
‘safe harbour’ standardization agreements on the one
hand and on the other hand the effects-based assess-
ment of standardisation agreements outside the scope
of the ‘safe harbour’ exception.
IV. Practical consequences for
companies
A. Block Exemption Regulations on R&D and
Specialisation
In general the revised new block exemption regu-
lations—the R&D BER and the Specialisation BER—
contain useful clarifications in comparison to the
former versions of these guidelines. As such they will
bring additional value to the companies and their advi-
sors and create ‘safe harbours’ for certain defined types
of research and development agreements as well as
specialisation agreements which are covered by the
revised block exemption regulations.
Specialisation block exemption regulation
As such the revised block exemption regulations define
certain ‘safe harbours’ for an exemption from Article
101 TFEU. These ‘safe harbours’ provide companies
with a degree of legal certainty. Outside the scope of
the ‘safe harbours’ there is, however, no presumption
that agreements will automatically be considered
anticompetitive under Article 101 TFEU. In this case,
agreements need to be assessed individually on a case-
by-case basis to determine whether they will fall within
the exceptions of Article 101(3) TFEU.
The self-assessment in this case depends on the rel-
evant market as well as on the possibility of illustrating
that each of the cumulative conditions of Article
101(3) TFEU—efficiency gains, indispensability, pass-
on of benefits to consumer, and no elimination of
competition—is met. Regarding efficiency gains, the
Specialisation BER recognises that specialisation and
joint production agreements may have a pro-competi-
tive effect if they permit parties to benefit from econ-
omies of scale that would not have been available to
each party individually. Cooperation may also result in
improved production technology and an improved
product quality.
The condition of indispensability, however, could
create a hurdle for companies in the self-assessment
process. The Specialisation BER states that joint com-
mercialisation of products could be considered as pro-
blematic. In cases where a joint commercialisation
of products cannot be shown as indispensable for
36 Barthelmeß and Gauß, ‘Die Lizenzierung standardessentieller Patente im
Kontext branchenweit vereinbarter Standards unter dem Aspekt des Art.
101 AEUV’ [2010] WuW 626–36; Layne-Farrar, Padilla and Schmalensee,
‘Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making
Sense of FRAND Commitments’ [2007] 74 Antitrust Law Journal 671.
37 See Schellingerhout and Cavicchi, ‘Patent ambush in standard-setting: the
Commission accepts commitments from Rambus to lower memory chip
royalty rates’ [2010] 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 32, 36.
38 See van der Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The Commission´s New Guidance on
Standardisation’ [2010] JECLAP 352–355.
39 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 281.
40 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 282.
41 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 293.
42 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 283.
43 See van der Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The Commission’s New Guidance on
Standardisation’ [2010] JECLAP 352–355.
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achieving efficiency gains, this could create some uncer-
tainty as to the question of whether the agreement may
be exempted or not.
In order to fulfil the condition of passing-on benefits
to consumers the specialisation or joint production
agreement must grant consumers a fair share of the
benefit resulting from the efficiency gains. This should
be easy to prove if the agreement leads to lower prices
or better quality of the products. Finally, the agreement
must not eliminate competition in respect of a substan-
tial part of the products.
R&D Block Exemption Regulation
The revised R&D BER exempts several research and
development agreements from the general prohibition
under Article 101(1) TFEU.44 As such there are several
‘safe harbours’ for companies in this area, which com-
prise agreements for (i) the carrying out of joint
research and development; (ii) agreement for joint
research and development combined with an agreement
for joint commercialisation of joint research and devel-
opment results; (iii) agreements that provide commer-
cialisation by one party under an exclusive licence; and
(iv) agreements which oblige one party to carry out
research and development work for the other party.
B. Information exchange
The practical implications of the new Horizontal
Guidelines on information exchange differ regarding
the form of information exchange. There are too many
forms of information exchange depending on the
various industries and the companies to build cat-
egories for all of them. The typical practices of direct
information exchange, however, may include for
example (besides direct discussions between competi-
tors or through trade associations) different forms of
information exchange such as data exchange through
black box systems, market specific panels, distribution
panels, industry research, governmental sources,
customs data, or field force surveys. How different the
forms of information exchange may be even in these
traditional forms of exchange will be illustrated on the
basis of the following examples of some typical forms
of information exchange.
Black box data exchange systems
The procedure referred to with this term is the market-
size assessment based on actual sales numbers on a pre-
determined schedule. Sometimes it is set-up by specific
associations or, if independently, by a group of compa-
nies representing the biggest share of the market. The
participating companies provide their sales numbers in
a predefined structure to a trustee who compiles the
market value report accordingly. The individual
company would be able to identify its own share
within the total market and each partition of the struc-
ture in this report. In this specific case of data
exchange, entering information where a company can
learn about market share, sales volume, or price infor-
mation from individual competitors is not allowed.
Panel exchange systems
Panel exchange systems refer to the data collection by
an industry association or a private market research
company. The exchange system may return information
about products, product application, and eventually
qualitative information. The market research company
is either contracted by an open group of companies
interested in this type of data or has actively sold its
offer to a number of companies. The number of com-
panies participating is mainly limited to the bigger
players due to the rather high investment required.
Distribution panel
This sort of information exchange system refers to data
collection at distributor or retailer level, usually done
by a market research company. The information col-
lected can be looking at sales volumes or stock levels at
different levels of detail (brand, product category, etc.).
This information can be grouped by product, product
types or selling companies, depending on the contrac-
tual agreements.
Industry research
This procedure refers to a data collection process con-
ducted by consultants or market research firms. During
this process the consultants or firms gather market
information from various sources (manufacturers, dis-
tributors, associations, advisors, consultants, customers
etc.). The information collected may target different
levels of detail (total market, sector values, specific
values, key products, etc.). Through a process of cross-
comparing, aggregation, and disaggregation the market
research firms synthesise a market picture at a sales of
consumption level.
Government sources
In some industries national statistical bureaus may
conduct specific surveys for certain products or services
as well. The purchase or use of specific products or
service could be the subject of or part of these surveys.
44 Article 2(1) of the R&D BER.
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Results are usually published by the governmental
source and some results are generally made available to
the public.
Customs data
In addition, in some industries, national customs keeps
records on the export and import of specific products.
The trade balance plus eventual domestic sales can give
a good indication of the overall market value in sales
terms. Depending on the availability of customs data,
detailed conclusions on manufacturing or distributing
companies as well as on product type or even active
ingredients might be revealed.
In all of these typical forms of information exchange
it is evident that it is illegal to exchange information
which would be considered commercially sensitive or
secret or to allow access to individualised competitive
information. It is also critical to make use of non-
public information (sources) and to exchange infor-
mation on future market or market share development
expectations. Because of the limited aggregation of sen-
sitive information, it is also not permissible to enter
into an exchange of information if it is substantially
restricted to a limited number of participants only. It
is also clearly not permissible to grant access to indivi-
dualised competitive information, to make use of non-
public sensitive information and to exchange infor-
mation on future market or market share development.
However, there are a various specific questions relat-
ing to the specific form of exchange. In the case of data
exchange through a black box data exchange system, for
example, the question may arise whether there is
enough data aggregation granted by a system which
does not allow the parties to learn about market share,
sales volume, or price information from individual com-
petitors. The panel exchange system may raise the ques-
tion of whether the number of companies participating
in this exchange system is too limited or whether restric-
tion to the bigger players may lead to concerns. In
addition any form of investment or any other form of
payment in order to acquire the information may lead
to the question of whether this information may still be
considered as public information since several—at least
smaller—companies may not be able to afford these
investment and, as a result, will be excluded from this
information. Due to the rather high investment
required, companies run the risk that the exchange may
be considered as non-public information which might
not be available to all competitors on the market.
While there are some information exchanges that are
clearly permissible, and some information exchanges
that are clearly anticompetitive and therefore prohib-
ited, cases which do not fall into one of these categories
are difficult to assess. These cases fall into the so-called
‘grey zone’.45 While the Horizontal Guidelines explain
some examples of illegal information exchange—which
are rather easy to assess since they constitute forms of
anticompetitive information exchange—the new Hori-
zontal Guidelines give few examples of what can be con-
sidered as pro-competitive and legal information
exchange. Thus, the competitive assessment of infor-
mation exchanges may not be straightforward.46
In addition, besides these traditional types of infor-
mation exchanges there are various other forms of infor-
mation exchange which are not covered by the new
Horizontal Guidelines but which are of practical impor-
tance. One area of information exchange which is not
explicitly covered by the new Horizontal Guidelines is
information exchange in the context of M&A projects,
especially in the context of due diligence activities or
during the phase between signing and closing. It is clear
that ‘gun jumping’ is not allowed, however, the question
remains how the closing of a deal may be prepared
without any information exchange between the involved
companies of a merger.
There is no indication in the text of the new Horizon-
tal Guidelines that, for example, during due diligence pro-
cesses the Horizontal Guidelines will not apply or at least
what kind of information is exchangeable in the context
of merger deals. This means that as a general rule compe-
titors should not exchange sensitive information such as,
for example, prices, discounts, conditions of supply,
profit margins, cost structures, calculation practices, dis-
tribution practices, territories, and customers. Other
forms of information gathering during a due diligence
process, such as information on the future strategies of
the target as well as other data required to evaluate the
target are not easy to assess under the new Horizontal
Guidelines. In this case the Commission should take into
account when assessing such cases that there may be legit-
imate business reasons for this form of ‘exchange’ which
may not be anticompetitive. This approach, however, will
not help the parties of merger at the time of merger nego-
tiations and notifications.
C. Standardisation
The new chapter on standardisation agreements is sub-
stantially revised and amended. The new chapter now
45 See Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’ [2010] KSzW 87.
46 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’, [2010] KSzW 87, 88.
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comprises—when compared to the chapter in the
former guidelines—helpful clarifications. In addition, it
contains ‘safe harbour’ conditions under Article 101(1)
TFEU which, together with the new clarifications,
create real value for companies.
Although the new chapter results in considerable
advantages there are still some open questions. It is
unclear, for example, whether the FRAND rules will
apply for small standard-setting groups in the same way.
And there is no indication in the new chapter regarding
the consequences under Article 101 TFEU if one of the
participations of a standardisation agreements fails to
license the technology on FRAND terms. From a legal
point of view this could lead to a violation of Article
101 TFEU, which could lead to the standardisation
agreement being nullified according to Article 101(2)
TFEU. In practice, however, this would not help greatly,
if the standard is already widely applied by companies.
In addition there are not many indications for self-
assessment in cases where a standardisation agreement
falls outside the scope of a ‘safe harbour’. If the stan-
dardisation agreement falls within Article 101(1) TFEU,
it could be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU. Unfor-
tunately, the guidance on this point is rather limited and
often repeats general priniciples that were discussed
under the section on Article 101(1) TFEU.47
V. Critical analysis and conclusions
A. Critical analysis
Restated block exemption regulations
In general the Specialisation BER and the R&D BER do
not represent a radical departure from the previous regu-
latory regime for specialisation and joint production
agreements and for research and development agree-
ments. The scope of the exemptions, however, is broader
than the exemptions provided under the previous block
exemption regulations. For R&D agreements, for
example, the new R&D BER applies also to paid R&D
services which were not covered by the former regulation.
The former regulation also did not clearly extend the
exemption to agreements providing for the commerciali-
sation of the results by one party only, based on an exclu-
sive licence.
Besides this useful extension of the scope of ‘safe
harbours’ the amendments of the regulations are rela-
tively minor in nature. They could be considered as
updates of the previous practice of the Commission
rather than a wholesale change of the applicable rules.
Therefore, companies that are familiar with the pre-
vious block exemption regulations should not find it
difficult to navigate the revised Specialisation BER and
R&D BER in general.
Horizontal Guidelines
There is no doubt that horizontal cooperation agreements
such as information exchanges can lead to efficiencies and
pro-competitive effects. The new Horizontal Guidelines
notice that ‘horizontal cooperation agreements can lead to
substantial economic benefits, in particular if they
combine complementary activities, skills or assets’.48 They
ascertain further that ‘horizontal cooperation can be a
means to share risk, save costs, increase investments, pool
know-how, enhance product quality and variety, and
launch innovation faster’.49 Thus, horizontal cooperation
agreements are also not regarded as per se illegal by the
revised Horizontal Guidelines. However, in order to bring
these pro-competitive effects and efficiencies to live legal
certainty is required.
Without this legal certainty companies will still run
the risk of infringing competition law which will result
in heavy fines and severe other consequences in the form
of high compensation claims. In this context, it is a
logical consequence that companies tend to be overcau-
tious. This leads to a scenario which is affected by ‘over
compliance by companies. This, on the other hand, will
implicate less efficiencies and pro-competitive effects.
A solution would have been the introduction of
certain de-miminis thresholds, at least for agreements
without any restriction by object. It may be the case that
information exchange which is based on legitimate
business reasons and which do not restrict competition
by object may not have any anti-competitive effect and,
thus, may be unproblematic from a competition law
point of view. It should be sufficiently clear, for example,
that information exchange is permissible where undertak-
ings in an atomistic market that do not collectively
control a large market share want to aggregate their infor-
mation about the development of consumer demand for
a certain product, so as to arrive at significant industry
statistics.50 In this context the new Horizontal Guidelines
notice that ‘if the parties have a low combined market
share, the horizontal cooperation agreement is unlikely to
give rise to restrictive effects on competition with the
meaning of Article 101(1) and, normally, no further
analysis will be required’. This notice, however, does not
gives sufficient official guidance on how to assess what is
47 See van der Walle de Ghelcke, ‘The Commission´s New Guidance on
Standardisation’ [2010] JECLAP 352–355.
48 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 2.
49 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 2.
50 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’ [2010] KSzW 87–94.
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meant by ‘a low combined market share’. The new Hori-
zontal Guidelines do not give any indication on this
specific question.
The Guidelines further state ‘what is considered to
be a “low combined market share” depends on the type
of agreement in question’. In this respect the Horizontal
Guidelines refer to the De Minimis Notice.51,52 The
question is whether the ‘low combined market share’
for horizontal cooperation agreements is the same as
mentioned in the De Minimis Notice or whether it is
higher for such kind of agreements. If the market share
is the same then the new Horizontal Guidelines do not
bring extra value, since the thresholds are already estab-
lished in the De Minimis Notice. If the thresholds are
higher, then the question still remains: what is meant
by a ‘low combined market share’.
It seems, however, that it may be not the same, since
the new Horizontal Guidelines notice that ‘if one of
just two parties has only an insignificant market share
and if it does not possess important resources, even a
high combined market share normally cannot be seen
as indicating a likely restrictive effect on competition in
the market’.53 Thus, the notice in the Horizontal
Guidelines is logical: ‘Given the variety of horizontal
cooperation agreements and the different effects they
may cause in different market situations, it is not poss-
ible to give a general market share threshold above
which sufficient market power for causing restrictive
effects on competition can be assumed’.54 This is a
logical consequence but does not provide legal cer-
tainty. This could lead to a situation where companies
may not agree on efficient horizontal cooperation
agreements above the thresholds of the De Minimis
Notice.
Besides the lack of any de minimis thresholds beyond
the De Minimis Notice, the new chapter on information
exchange does not provide additional ‘safe harbours’
for certain forms of information exchange. Neither do
the guidelines define what is meant, for example, by
‘historic information’ or which level of ‘aggregation’ is
not considered as problematic, nor do the new Hori-
zontal Guidelines give any indication on the question
what is really meant by ‘public information’. The
refusal to establish ‘safe harbours’ leads to the result
that the new chapter on information exchange could be
regarded as largely worthless in the eyes of the prac-
titioner.55
Another critical area seems to be the public
announcement of company information. Where a
company announces publicly, for example in the inter-
net or via the press, its future strategy on new pro-
ducts, capacity, or pricing, this could be regarded as a
form of information exchange, since competitors could
use this information to adapt their own capacity or
pricing strategy accordingly. Not every public
announcement of company information, however, may
be anticompetitive. There are often legitimate business
reasons behind the announcement such as, for
example, the publication of a price list of distributors
of a specific product. Competition authorities need to
consider carefully in this case whether the publication
of certain company information is clearly anticompeti-
tive.
These examples illustrate the difficulties in establish-
ing ‘hard and fast rules’ which apply in all cases of
information exchange. In practice it is sometimes diffi-
cult to distinguish between information exchange that
is anticompetitive and will restrict competition on the
one hand and information exchange that could provide
a transparency to the market which is actually pro-
competitive with some benefits for competition and the
consumer.
It is clear that transparency in the market could
support tacit collusion, coordination within a cartel,
and monitoring compliance with a cartel. Knowledge
of a competitor’s strategies on pricing or capacity
removes the uncertainty in the market that underpins
competition. As such, information exchange has its
assets and drawbacks: information exchange can be
both—depending of the circumstances of each case—
pro-competitive and anticompetitive. On the one hand
it is a basic element of benchmarking and competition,
on the other hand it may lead to massive anticompeti-
tive results, such as anticompetitive agreements or col-
lusive behaviour up to hard core restrictions. This
makes it very difficult to establish clear-cut rules for
the assessment of information exchange in guidelines
which are generally applicable. From an analytical
point of view, the difficulties in assessing information
exchange between competitors are based on the
51 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty
establishing the European Community (de minimis) OJ C 368, 22/12/
2001, 13-15.
52 See Horizontal Guidelines, para. 44.
53 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 44.
54 See Horizontal Guidelines, para. 44.
55 Wagner-von Papp, ‘Information Exchanges in the Draft Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines’ [2010] KSzW 87, 91. However, Wagner-von
Papp does not consider this as a ‘damning critique on the Guidelines’,
since the ‘factors determining the harmfulness of information exchanges
are “compensatory” in that there is no single factor which cannot be
compensated by other factors, alone or in combination’.
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‘janus-face’ of market transparency, which also cannot
be clearly categorised as pro- or anticompetitive.
B. Conclusions
Indeed, the new and revised chapters in the Horizontal
Guidelines as well as the revised block exemption regu-
lations are clearly a step in the right direction to the
extent that they provide additional guidance. This gui-
dance, however, does not remove the uncertainty com-
pletely and gives advice to a certain extent only. In
general, the Commission is adopting a more conserva-
tive stance. The guidelines simply provide a general
analytical framework, which should be adapted to the
particular circumstances in a given case. Although the
documents comprise some examples, the guidelines are
meant to provide indications regarding the reasoning
and relevant factors only.
Clearly, the Commission seemed to be anxious and
tried to avoid making any specific statements regarding
‘safe harbours’ or further de minimis thresholds that
could be seen as specific ‘safe harbours’. Instead, the
tone adopted is somewhat uncommitted and the sub-
stance goes no further than what has already been estab-
lished by existing policy, Commission decisions and
case law from the EU Courts. Maybe one of the reasons
for this is that the Commission sought to eliminate the
creation of ‘loopholes’ by defining provisions that are
too specific but which could not comprise all possible
cases of information exchange. This means that there
are no hard and fast rules which could be easily applied
to all cases in daily business. The assessment is still
focused on a case-by-case analysis of each single
instance.
Although it is fundamentally important for compa-
nies to be familiar with the revised rules whenever
they cooperate with competitors and while mistakes
can have potentially severe consequences, the new
documents may not be precise enough to clearly
assess the question of whether a cooperation is
allowed in a specific case or not. The difference
between permissible cooperation and an illegal cartel
can often be quite difficult to discern. In this respect,
as Director General Alexander Italianer commented
on the new Horizontal Guidelines ‘most of the time
competitors compete, but cooperation can neverthe-
less be key in developing and marketing existing or
new products’,56 it is a good sign. A clear legal assess-
ment in any one single case, however, may remain
difficult if not impossible.
This means for the companies that there still remain
some cases of information exchange which are not
clearly identifiable as anti- or pro-competitive. As such,
companies that participate in information exchange are
still walking on thin ice. This creates ‘chilling effects’
which may lead to ‘over compliance’ by the companies.
As such, efficiencies which could be created by some
forms of cooperation may never come into existence.
This should be kept at the back of one’s mind when
assessing cases under the revised guidelines and regu-
lations. As such the new documents are one step in the
right direction since they try to give more guidance - it
remains to whish that there will be further steps in this
direction in the near future.
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